Abstract Many generic constructions for building secure cryptosystems from primitives with lower level of security have been proposed. Providing security proofs has also become standard practice. There is, however, a lack of automated verification procedures that analyze such cryptosystems and provide security proofs. In this paper, we present a sound and automated procedure that allows us to verify that a generic asymmetric encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks in the random oracle model. It has been applied to several examples of encryption schemes among which the construction of Bellare
Introduction
Our day-to-day lives increasingly depend upon information and our ability to manipulate it securely. This requires solutions based on cryptographic systems (primitives and protocols). In 1976, Diffie and Hellman invented public-key cryptography [15] , coined the notion of one-way functions and discussed the relationship between cryptography and complexity theory. Shortly after, the first cryptosystem with a reductionist security proof appeared [20] . The next breakthrough towards formal proofs of security was the adoption of computational theory for the purpose of rigorously defining the security of cryptographic schemes. In this framework, a system is provably secure if there is a polynomial-time reduction proof from a hard problem to an attack against the security of the system. The provable security framework has been later refined into the exact (also called concrete) security framework where better estimates of the computational complexity of attacks is achieved. While research in the field of provable cryptography has achieved tremendous progress towards rigorously defining the functionalities and requirements of many cryptosystems, little has been done for developing computer-aided proof methods or more generally for investigating a proof theory for cryptosystems as it exists for imperative programs, concurrent systems, reactive systems, etc.
In this paper, we present an automated proof method for analyzing generic asymmetric encryption schemes in the random oracle model (ROM). Generic encryption schemes aim at transforming schemes with weak security properties, such as onewayness, into schemes with stronger security properties, specifically security against chosen ciphertext attacks. Examples of generic encryption schemes are [7, 8, 13, 18, 19, 21, 23, 25] . In this paper we propose a compositional Hoare logic for proving IND-CPA security. An important feature of our method is that it is not based on a global reasoning as it is the case for the game-based approach [9, 22] . Instead, it is based on local reasoning. Indeed, both approaches can be considered complementary as the Hoare logic-based one can be considered as aiming at characterizing by means of predicates the set of contexts in which the game transformations can be applied safely. In future work [11] , we also present a method for proving plaintext awareness (PA). Plaintext awareness together with IND-CPA security imply IND-CCA security [3] . Combining the results of this paper with plaintext awareness, leads to a proof method for verifying the constructions in [7, 18, 19] .
Related work We restrict our discussion to work aiming at providing computational proofs for cryptosystems. In particular, this excludes symbolic verification. We mentioned above the game-based approach [9, 17, 22] . B. Blanchet and D. Pointcheval developed a dedicated tool, CryptoVerif, that supports security proofs within the game-based approach [5, 6] . From the theoretical point of view, the main differences in our approaches are the following. CryptoVerif is based on observational equivalence. The equivalence relation induces rewriting rules applicable in contexts that satisfy some properties. Invariants provable in our Hoare logic can be considered as logical representations of these contexts. Moreover, as we are working with invariants, that is we follow a state-based approach, we need to prove results that link our invariants to game-based properties such as indistinguishability (cf. Propositions 1 and 3). G. Barthe, J. Cederquist and S. Tarento were among the first to provide machine-checked proofs of cryptographic schemes without relying on the perfect cryptography hypothesis. They have provided formal models of the Generic Model and the Random Oracle Model in the Coq proof assistant, and used this formalization to prove hardness of the discrete logarithm [1] , security of signed ElGamal encryption against interactive attacks [10] , and of Schnorr signatures against forgery attacks [24] . Recently in [4] , the authors have been developing CertiCrypt, which provides support for formalizing game-based proofs in the Coq proof assistant. They have used their formalization to give machine-checked proofs of IND-CPA for OAEP. Another interesting piece of work to mention is the Hoare-style proof system proposed by R. Corin and J. Den Hartog for game-based cryptographic proofs [12] . Yet, there is no computer-assistance for the developed logic. In [14] , Datta et al. present a computationally sound compositional logic (PCL) for key exchange protocols. PCL has been applied successfully to the IEEE 802.11i wireless security standard and the IETF GDOI standard. PCL is a computationally sound Hoarelike logic for indistinguishability; one important difference is that, being focused on protocols, PCL does not provide support for standard cryptographic constructions such as one-way functions.
Outline In Section 2, we introduce notions used in the rest of the paper. In Section 3 we define our programming language and generic asymmetric encryption schemes. In Section 4, we present our Hoare logic for proving IND-CPA security. In Section 5, we explain how we can automate our procedure. Finally we conclude in Section 6 .
Preliminaries
In this section, we recall some basic definitions as well as poly-time indistinguishability. To do so, let us first introduce the following notations. If d is a distribution over a set E, we use v . . , u ik )] denotes the distribution obtained by performing the samplings in the order they are written and returning the result which is specified after the semicolon.
We are interested in analyzing generic schemes for asymmetric encryption assuming ideal hash functions. That is, we are working in the random oracle model [7, 16] . Using standard notations, we write H r ← to denote that H is chosen uniformly at random from the set of functions with appropriate domain. By abuse of notation, for a list H = H 1 , · · · , H n of hash functions, we write H r ← instead of the sequence H 1 r ← , . . . , H n r ← . We fix a finite set {H 1 , . . . , H n } of hash functions and also a finite set of trapdoor permutations. We assume an arbitrary but fixed ordering on and H; this allows us to freely switch between set-based and vector-based notation. A distribution ensemble is a countable sequence of distributions {X η } η∈AE over states, H and . We only consider distribution ensembles that can be constructed in polynomial time in η by probabilistic algorithms that have oracle access to Hthis set is formally defined in the next section. Given two distribution ensembles X = {X η } η∈AE and X = {X η } η∈AE , an algorithm A and η ∈ AE, we define the advantage of A in distinguishing X η and X η as the following quantity:
The probabilities are taken over X and the random coins used by the probabilistic adversary A. We insist, above, that for each hash function H, the probabilities are indeed taken over the set of maps with the appropriate type. Two distribution ensembles X and X are called indistinguishable, denoted by X ∼ X , if Adv(A, η, X, X ) is negligible as a function of η, for any polynomial-time (in η) probabilistic algorithm A. All security notions we are going to use are in the ROM, where all algorithms, including adversaries, are equipped with oracle access to the hash functions.
A Simple Programming Language for Encryption and Decryption Oracles
In this section, we fix a notation for specifying encryption schemes. The notation we choose is a simple imperative language with random assignment. The language does not include loops since loops are usually not used for generic encryption schemes. Moreover, whereas the language allows the application of a trapdoor permutation f , it does not include the application of the inverse of a permutation. This choice is due to the fact that our analysis is carried out on encryption algorithms only, which, in the case of generic encryption schemes, seldom use permutation inverses. Let Var be a finite set of variables. We assume that Var is large enough to deal with the considered examples. It should be obvious that our results do not depend on the size of Var. Our programming language is built according to the following BNF described in Table 1 , where: -x r ← U samples a value in U η and assigns it to x. Here, (U η ) η is the family of uniform distributions over the set of bit-strings of length τ (x, η), where τ (x, η) is a polynomial in η.
-x := f (y) applies the trapdoor one-way function f to the value of y and assigns the result to x. -x := H(y) applies the hash function H to the value of y and assigns the result to x. As a side effect, the pair (v, H(v)), where v is the value of y, is added to the variable Ì H which stores the queries to the hash function H.
-x := y ⊕ z applies the exclusive or operator to the values of y and z and assigns the result to x. -x := y||z represents the concatenation of the values of y and z.
-c 1 ; c 2 is the sequential composition of c 1 and c 2 .
-N (x, y) : var x 1 ; · · · ; x n ; c is a procedure declaration, where N is its name (identifier for encryption or decryption procedure), var x 1 ; · · · ; x n ; declares the local variables x 1 , · · · , x n , c is the body of the procedure and x and y are the input and output variables, respectively.
Example 1
The following command encodes the encryption scheme proposed by Bellare and Rogaway in [7] (shortly f (r)||in e ⊕ G(r)||H(in e ||r)): 
. By abuse of notation we also denote the lifted semantics by
It is easy to prove that commands preserve the values of H and ( f, f −1 ).
Therefore, we can, without ambiguity, write
). According to our semantics, commands denote functions that transform distributions on configurations to distributions on configurations. However, only distributions that are constructible are of interest.
A family X of distributions is called constructible, if there is an algorithm A such that
where is a trapdoor permutation generator that on input η generates an η-bit-string trapdoor permutation pair ( f, f −1 ), and A is a poly-time probabilistic algorithm with oracle access to the hash function, and such that A's queries to the hash oracles are recorded in the lists Ì H 's in S. The latter condition should not be understood as a restriction on the set of considered adversaries. Indeed, it does not mean that the adversaries need to honestly record their queries in the Ì H lists. It rather means that in our reduction proofs, when we simulate such adversaries, we need to record their Table 2 The semantics of the programming language
queries. We emphasize that the algorithm denoted above by A can, but does not necessarily represent (only) an adversary, e.g. it can be the sequential composition of an adversary and a command. We denote by Dist( , H, ) the set of constructible families of distributions. Distributions that are element of a constructible family of distributions are called constructible too.
Notice that [[c]](X) ∈ Dist( , H, ), for any command c and X ∈ Dist( , H, ).
Generic Asymmetric Encryption Schemes
We are interested in generic constructions that convert any trapdoor permutation into a public-key encryption scheme. More specifically, our aim is to provide an automatic verification method for generic encryption schemes. 
Then, we require that Out(S, H, ( f, f −1 )) = Out(S , H, ( f, f −1 )) holds, for every states S and S such that S(in e ) = S (in e ).
Let S 0 be the state that associates the bit-string 0 τ (x,η) , for any variable x ∈ Var that ranges over {0, 1}
τ (x,η) , and the empty list [ ] with each variable in Ì H . Then, the usual definition of the IND-CPA security criterion (e.g. see [3] ) can be stated as follows:
: var x; c) be a generic encryption scheme Notice that because of the condition put on generic encryption schemes, the choice of the state S 0 is not crucial. In other words, we can replace S 0 by any other state, we then get the same distribution of S (out e ) as a result. In fact, an equivalent formulation of Definition 2, consists in considering that the 1st-phase adversary A 1 outputs a state S, such that messages m 0 and m 1 are stored in variables x 0 and x 1 and that σ is stored in variable x σ :
Thus, we arrive at the following more appropriate equivalent definition of IND-CPA:
: var x; c) be a generic encryption scheme and A be an adversary and X ∈ Dist( , H, ). For η ∈ AE, let
We say that GE is IND-CPA secure, if Adv
is negligible for any constructible distribution ensemble X and polynomial-time adversary A.
A Hoare Logic for IND-CPA Security
In this section, we present our Hoare logic for proving IND-CPA security. We prove that the presented logic is sound. In addition to axioms that deal with each basic command and operation, random assignment, concatenation, xor, etc..., our logic includes the usual sequential composition and consequence rules of the Hoare logic. In order to apply the consequence rule, we use entailment (logical implication) between assertions as in Lemma 2.
Our Hoare logic can be easily transformed into a procedure that allows us to prove properties by computing invariants of the encryption oracle. More precisely, the procedure annotates each control point of the encryption command with a set of predicates that hold at that point for any execution. Given an encryption oracle E(in e , out e ) : var x; c we want to prove that at the final control point, we have an invariant that tells us that the value of out e is indistinguishable from a random value. Classically, this implies IND-CPA security.
First, we present the assertion language we use to express the invariant properties we are interested in. Then, we present a set of rules of the form {ϕ}c{ϕ }, meaning that execution of command c in any distribution that satisfies ϕ leads to a distribution that satisfies ϕ . Using Hoare logic terminology, this means that the triple {ϕ}c{ϕ } is valid. From now on, we suppose that the adversary has access to the hash functions H, and he is given the trapdoor permutation f , but not its inverse f −1 .
The Assertion Language
Before specifying the assertion language, we give a few definitions and notations that we use to define the predicates of the language.
Definition 4
The set of variables used as substring of an expression e is denoted subvar(e): x ∈ subvar(e) iff e = x or e = e 1 ||e 2 and x ∈ subvar(e 1 ) ∪ subvar(e 2 ), for some expressions e 1 and e 2 .
For example, consider the following expression:
Definition 5 Let X be a family of distributions in Dist( , H, ) and V 1 and V 2 be sets of local variables or variables in Var.
we denote the following distribution family (on tuples of bit-strings):
Here S(V 1 ) is the point-wise application of S to the elements of V 1 and f (S(V 2 )) is the point-wise application of f to the elements of S(V 2 ). We say that X and X are
We emphasize that in the above definition, we have that V 1 , V 2 ⊆ Var, and since
every time we use the equivalence ∼ V1;V2 , the variables H i are not given to the adversary.
Example 2 Let S 0 be any state and let H 1 be a hash function. Recall that we are working in the ROM. Consider the following distributions:
η . Then, we have X ∼ {y};{x} X but we do not have X ∼ {y,x};∅ X , because then the adversary can query the value of H 1 (x) and match it to that of y.
Definition 6
We write νx · X η to denote the following distribution:
We recall that U is the family of uniform distributions on the values on which x ranges. We lift this notation to families of distributions in usual way:
Our assertion language is defined by the following grammar, where ψ defines the set of atomic assertions:
where V 1 , V 2 ⊆ Var and e is an expression constructible (by the adversary) out of the variables used in the program, that is to say, possibly using concatenation, xor, hash oracles or f .
Intuitively, Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) is satisfied by a distribution on configurations, if given values of variables in V 1 and images by f of values of variables in V 2 , any polynomial adversary in η has negligible probability to distinguish between the following two distributions: first, the distribution resulting of computations performed using the original value of x as is in X, secondly, the distribution resulting from computations performed replacing everywhere the value of x by a random value of the same length as x. In Section 4.4, in order to analyze schemes using one-way functions f that are not permutations, we generalize the predicate Indis into Indis f . The predicate Indis f models the fact that the adversary cannot distinguish between the value of a variable and the image by f of a random value sampled uniformly. The assertion WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ) stands for Weak Secret and is satisfied by a distribution, if any adversary has negligible probability to compute the value of x, when he is given the values of the variables in V 1 and the image by the one-way permutation of those in V 2 . Lastly, H(H, e) is satisfied when the probability that the value of e has been submitted to the hash oracle H is negligible.
Notations We use Indis(νx; V) instead of Indis(νx; V; ∅) and Indis(νx) instead of Indis(νx; Var). Similarly WS(x; V) stands for WS(x; V; ∅).
Formally, the meaning of the assertion language is defined by a satisfaction relation X |= ϕ, which tells us when a family of distributions on configurations X satisfies the assertion ϕ.
The satisfaction relation X |= ψ is defined as follows:
Moreover, we write ϕ ⇒ ϕ iff for any family of distributions X such that X |= ϕ, then X |= ϕ .
The relation between our Hoare triples and semantic security is established by the following proposition that states that if the value of out e is indistinguishable from a random value then the scheme considered is IND-CPA (see [2] for details). Indeed, if {true}c{Indis(νout e )} holds then the encryption scheme is secure with respect to randomness of ciphertext. It is standard that randomness of ciphertext implies IND-CPA security.
Proposition 1 Let ( , E(in
In the rest of the paper, for simplicity, we omit to write the draw of f and its inverse, and we do not mention them in the description of the configurations either.
Some Properties of the Assertion Language
In this section, we prove properties of our assertions that are useful for proving IND-CPA security of encryption schemes and soundness of our Hoare Logic.
The predicates Indis and WS are compatible with indistinguishability in the following sense:
Lemma 1 For any X, X ∈ Dist( , H, ), any sets of variables V 1 and V 2 , and any variable x:
Proof By symmetry of indistinguishability and equivalence, for each proposition, the conclusion follows from a single implication.
Let us start with the proof of the first item. We assume X ∼ V1;V2 X which is equivalent to X ∼ V1;V2 X. Hence, νx.X ∼ V1;V2 νx.X ; this can be justified by an immediate reduction. Moreover, the hypothesis X |= Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ) implies X ∼ V1;V2 νx.X. By transitivity of the indistinguishability relation, we get X ∼ V1;V2 νx.X . Thus, X |= Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ).
We now consider the second item. We prove by reduction that X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ) must hold, provided that X ∼ V1;V2∪{x} X and X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ). Given an adversary A that falsifies X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ), we construct an adversary B that falsifies X ∼ V1;V2∪{x} X . Informally, on input values for variables in V 1 and V 2 , denoted (v, v ), and a value u for f (x), B runs A on (v, v ), which outputs v x , its guess for x. Then B compares f (v x ) to u. If the equality holds, B answers 1 (that is, the values (v, v ) were sampled according to distribution X ); otherwise B answers a bit picked at random uniformly.
Let A denote the event
A] is negligible if and only if Adv B is negligible. Concerning the third item, it easy to see that a polynomial adversary dealing with X ∼ X , has access to all variables in Var ∪ Ì H , and hence he can evaluate the expression e and check whether the value he gets, is or not among the bit-strings obtained by projecting the list given by Ì H ∈ Ì H to the first element.
We now present a lemma that relates atomic assertions and states some monotonicity properties:
Proof The first two properties are straightforward. To prove the last assertion, we let X ∈ Dist( , H, ) such that X |= Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}). Thus, X ∼ V1;V2∪{x} νx.X. Lemma 1 allows us to say that it is sufficient to prove that νx.X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}) in order to conclude that X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}). Let us consider an adversary A against νx.X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}). It takes as input, among others, a value f (u) for f (x), with u r ← U. If A successfully computes a value for x, it obviously equals u, so that A in fact computes the pre-image of the one-way function f on the random value f (u). This latter event has a negligible probability to happen. Hence, we can conclude that X |= WS(x; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {x}).
An expression e is called constructible from (V 1 Dist( , H, ) ]](X ), guesses the right initial distribution with non-negligible probability. We let B be the following adversary against X ∼ V1;V2 X :
Lemma 3 For any X, X ∈
The idea is that B can evaluate in polynomial time the expression e using its own inputs. Hence it can provide the appropriate inputs to A. It is clear that the advantage of B is exactly that of A, which would imply that it is not negligible, although we assumed X ∼ V1;V2 X . Dist( , H, ) , computes the right value for z with non-negligible probability. We let B be the following adversary against X |= WS(z;
Corollary 1 For any X, X ∈
Since A and B have the same advantage, we obtain a contradiction, so that [[x := e]](X) |= WS(z; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ) cannot be true.
The Hoare Logic
In this section we present our Hoare logic for IND-CPA security. We begin with a set of preservation rules that tell us when an invariant established at the control point before a command can be transferred to the control point following the command. Then, for each command, we present a set of specific rules that allow us to establish new invariants. The commands that are not considered are usually irrelevant for IND-CPA security. We summarize all our Hoare logic rules in Table 3 (given at the end of the paper).
Generic Preservation Rules
We
(y) or t ⊕ H(y).
Before getting started, let us notice that for any of these commands c, 
We now give generic preservation rules for our predicates. We comment them right below.
Lemma 6
The following rules are sound, when z = x, and c is x r ← U or of the form x := e with e being either t||y or t ⊕ y or f (y) or H(y) or t ⊕ H(y): 
We assume x = y and z = x for the next rules (H4) {WS(y;
H5) {H(H, e) ∧ WS(z; y)}x := H(y){H(H, e)}, if z ∈ subvar(e) ∧ x / ∈ subvar(e) (H6) {Indis(νy; V
1 ; V 2 ∪ {y}) ∧ H(H, y)} x := H(y) {Indis(νy; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ∪ {y})}, if y ∈ V 1 (H7) {Indis(νz; V 1 ∪ {z}; V 2 )∧WS(y; V 1 ∪ {z}; V 2 )
∧H(H, y)}x := H(y){Indis(νz; V 1 ∪ {z, x}; V 2 )}
One-way function rules: when y ∈ V ∪ {x} (O1) {Indis(νy; 
-(G3) {H(H , e[e /x])} c {H(H , e)}, provided H = H in case c is either x := H(y) or x := t ⊕ H(y). Here, by convention, e[e /x] is either e if c is x r ← U or the expression obtained from e by replacing x by e in case c ≡ x := e .
The rules deal with predicates on a variable z different from x, y, t appearing in the command c that is applied. Thus, the predicates Indis and WS are quite intuitively preserved as soon as either x does not appear in sets V 1 , V 2 the adversary is provided, or x does appear, but the value of e was already deducible from values given for V 1 , V 2 . As for rule (G3), it is meant to express preservation of predicate H(H , .). Intuitively, if for states drawn in distribution X, e[e /x] has negligible probability to belong to Ì H before performing x := e , then e has negligible probability to belong to Ì H for states drawn in [[x := e ]](X), that is, once the command is performed. 
← [[c]](S , H) : S(e) ∈ S(Ì H ).dom].

Now, S (e[e /x]) 2 is equal to S(e) and S (Ì H ).dom = S(Ì H ).dom. Hence,
p η = Pr S r ← X η ; S r
← [[c]]S : S (e[e /x]) ∈ S (Ì H ).dom = Pr (S , H) r ← X η : S (e[e /x]) ∈ S (Ì H ).dom
Since X |= H(H , e[e /x]), the last probability is a negligible function of η. Therefore p η is also negligible in η and [[c]](X) |= H(H , e).
Random Assignment
Rule (R1) below states that Indis(νx) is satisfied after assigning a randomly sampled value to the variable x. Rule (R2) takes advantage of the fact that the cardinality of U is exponential in the security parameter, and that since e contains the freshly generated x the probability that it has already been submitted to H is small. Rules (R3) and (R4) state that the value of x cannot help an adversary in distinguishing the value of y from a random value in (R3) or computing its value in (R4). This is the case because the value of x is randomly sampled.
Lemma 7
The following rules are sound: 
(R2) The fact that x ∈ subvar(e) implies that there exists a poly-time function g such that g(S(e)) = S(x) for any state S (namely g consists in extracting the right substring corresponding to x from the expression e). We are interested in bounding
(S(Ì H ).dom)
which is negligible for the cardinality of Ì H is bounded by a polynomial.
(R3) The intuition is that x being completely random, providing its value to the adversary does not help him in any way. We show the result by reduction. 
Hash Functions
In this section, we present a set of proof rules that deal with hash functions in the random oracle model. We first state properties of hash functions that are used to prove soundness of our proof rules.
Preliminary Results
In the random oracle model, hash functions are drawn uniformly at random from the space of functions of suitable type at the beginning of the execution of a program. Thus, the images that the hash function associates to different inputs are completely independent. Therefore, one can delay the draw of each hash value until needed. This is the very idea that the first lemma formalizes. It states that while a hash value has not been queried, then one can redraw it without this changing anything from the adversary's point of view. We introduce the notation H{v → u} to denote the function behaving like H at any point except v, with which it associates u.
Lemma 8 (Dynamic draw) For any X ∈ Dist( , H, ) and any y ∈ Var such that X |= H(H, y), X ∼ ([(S,H)
Proof Let X ∈ Dist( , H, ) and y ∈ Var such that X |= H(H, y). H) ]. Let us we recall that for X ∈ Dist( , H, ) , all queries that have been made to the hash oracles are recorded in the lists Ì H .
First, we begin with some remarks which help us bounding the advantage of an adversary A trying to distinguish between X and X . Since X |= H (H, y) , and using the definition of X , it follows that the probability Pr[(S, H)
where n(·) is a negligible function. Indeed, the state output by distribution X η is not modified in the computation of
(Ì H ).dom], since under the condition S(y) ∈ S(Ì H ).dom, drawing H in
and redrawing the value of H on S(y) yields the same distribution as just drawing H in .
We then distinguish according to whether S(y) ∈ Ì H .dom
Pr[(S, H) r ← X η : S(y) ∈ S(Ì H ).dom]
We then take into account the equalities between terms justified above. 
H (S, H) by (S{Ì H → S(Ì H ) • (S(y), S(e))}, H {H} ∪ {H{S(y) → S(e)}}).
We extend this definition canonically to any family of distributions X ∈ Dist( , H, ): rebind y →e
H (S, H)]) η . It simply denotes the family of distributions where H(S(y)) is defined to be equal to S(e).
Lemma 9 (Rebinding Lemma) For any X ∈ Dist( , H, ), any hash function symbol H, any variables x and y, if X |= H(H, y), then
where α is either a constant or a variable.
Proof To lighten the proof, we assume without loss of generality that there is only one hash function H. First, since X |= H(H, y), thanks to the dynamic draw lemma, we know that
Then, using a similar reasoning to that used in the proof of Lemma 3 (but this time the adversary B has to update also the variable T H and to pass it to the adversary A), we get:
Executing the hash command, the second distribution is in turn equal to
(α)⊕u;Ì H → S(Ì H ) • (S(y), u)}, H{S(y) → u}) .
Then, we eventually replace the draw of y by that of x, and propagate the side effects of that change, to obtain another way to denote the same distribution:
•(S(y), v ⊕ S(α))}, H{S(y) → v ⊕ S(α)}) .
Now, this last distribution is exactly (rebind y →α⊕x H
(νx · X)) η , and we conclude. Now we are interested in formally proving the useful and intuitive following lemma, which states that to distinguish between a distribution and its 'rebound' version, an adversary must be able to compute the argument y whose hash value has been rebound. More precisely,
Lemma 10 (Hash vs. rebind) For any X ∈ Dist( , H, ), any two variables x and y, any two f inite sets of variables V 1 and V 2 , and any hash function H, if X |= WS(y; V
Proof Consider finite sets V 1 and V 2 and X such that X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ). The sole difference between the distributions is the value of H(y). Namely,
and it is the only difference between S and S
H{S(y) → S(α⊕x)} ∪ (H {H}))]
and since S is not used anywhere,
), H{S(y) → S(α⊕x)}∪(H {H}))]
An adversary trying to distinguish D(X, V 1 , V 2 ) η from this last distribution can only succeed if it calls H on S(y). However, the probability of an adversary computing S(y) is negligible since X |= WS(y;
Proof rules for hash functions
We are now prepared to present and prove our proof rules for hash functions. Rule (H1) captures the main feature of the random oracle model, namely that the hash function is a random function. Hence, if an adversary cannot compute the value of y and this latter has not been hashed yet then he cannot distinguish H(y) from a random value. Rule (H2) is similar to rule (R2): as the hash of a fresh value is seemingly random, it has negligible probability to have already been queried to another hash oracle.
Rule (H3) deserves a more elaborate comment. It concludes to a predicate still involving variable y, which is why it is different from rule (H1). It states that the value of variable x is random given first values of V 1 , x and f (V 2 ) as in rule (H1), but also the value of f (y). Indeed, as the value of y is seemingly random, we can use the definition of one-wayness to state that an adversary cannot efficiently compute a satisfactory value for f −1 ( f (y)). Hence, the value of y is unlikely to be queried to H, and the predicate holds.
Lemma 11
The following basic rules are sound, when x = y, and α is either a constant or a variable:
Proof (H1) First, we use that X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ), that provides thanks to rule (R4) νx.X |= WS(y; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ). Hence, the 'hash-vs-rebind' Lemma 10 applies, we obtain the following νx.X ∼ V1∪{x};V2 rebind y →x⊕α H (νx.X). Then, as we assumed that X |= H (H, y) , we can use the rebinding lemma, according to which we have the following rebind (H, y) , and let X = rebind
H (S, H) : S (e) ∈ S(Ì H ).dom or S (e) = S(y)
now with S(e) = S (e) by definition of the rebinding :
H (S, H) : S(e) ∈ S(Ì H ).dom or S(e) = S(y)
we can remove the rebinding, since it does not change the event:
(Ì H ).dom or S(e) = S(y)
which by definition and because we assume y = x equals
and as x ∈ subvar(e), i.e. x is some substring of e
Moreover, for every state S 1 , Card(S 1 (Ì H ).dom) is bounded by a polynomial in η, and variables in Var have a size polynomial in η too, so that p η is indeed a negligible function in η. (H3) Consider any X ∈ Dist( , H, ) . Assume y / ∈ V 1 and X |= Indis(νy; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {y}) ∧ H(H, y). Then, X |= WS(y; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {y}) follows from the third weakening lemma (see Lemma 2) . Consequently, rule H1 provides
We now comment on four other rules to deal with hash commands which are stated below. The idea behind (H4) is the following one: an adversary that is not able to compute the value of y, can not ask this value to H; hence, the value of x (computed as H(y)) seems completely random; so if z was not efficiently computable by the adversary given V 1 , f (V 2 ), it remains so when it is additionally provided x. Rule (H5) states that the fact that the value of e has probably not been hashed yet remains true after a hash command, as long as e contains a variable z whose value is not computable out from y. (H6) and (H7) give necessary conditions to the preservation of indistinguishability that is based on the apparent randomness of a hash value. The intuition behind rule (H6) is very similar to that of rule (H3). As for rule (H7), as we want more than just preserving the seemingly randomness of z with respect to V 1 , f (V 2 ), the conditions under which x doesn't help an adversary are that y is not easily deductible from V 1 , V 2 and that x is a fresh hash value.
Lemma 12
The following preservation rules are sound provided that x = y and z = x: We could do this proof by reduction too, the main idea being that as the value of x is random to an adversary, any adversary against WS(z; V 1 ; V 2 ) before the execution of the command could simulate an adversary against WS(z; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ) by providing this latter with a randomly sampled value in place of x. Both those adversaries would therefore have the same advantage. (H5) Since z ∈ subvar(e), there is a polynomial function g such that for every S, g(S(e)) = S(z) (namely g consists in extracting the right substring corresponding to z from the expression e). Given X ∈ Dist( , H, ), let p η be equal to:
= H(y)]](S) : S (e) ∈ S (Ì H ).dom]
Then, since the command only has an effect on x and Ì H ,
Now, we can bound the second term as follows:
for this is how g was defined Besides, X |= WS(z; y), so that the probability one can extract the value of z from that of y is negligible. ( , H, ) . Assume y / ∈ V 1 , and X |= Indis(νy; V 1 ; V 2 ∪ {y}) ∧ H(H, y). By rule (R3) for random assignment, since y = x, νx · X |= Indis(νy; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ∪ {y}). Therefore, using that y / ∈ V 1 and y = x and applying Lemma 2.3 we get νx · X |= WS(y; V 1 ∪ {x}; V 2 ∪ {y}). Now, the hash-vs-rebind Lemma 10 provides us with rebind 
One-Way Functions
Rules to deal with one-way functions are given below. The first rule captures onewayness of f . Indeed, it states that an adversary can not efficiently compute a preimage to an apparently random challenge. Rule (O2) and (O3) are meant to provide a little more than mere preservation of the properties of z. (O2) is quite obvious since f (y) is given to the adversary in the precondition. As for rule (O3), it follows from the fact that since y is apparently random with respect to values V 1 , z, f (V 2 ), hence computing x boils down to computing the image by f of a random value.
Consequently, providing an adversary with the values of x and f (y) does not help it. Rule (P1) simply ensues from the fact that f is a permutation and is thus surjective. However, y has to be removed from the sets in the conclusion, otherwise an adversary could compare the value of f (y) with the value given for x and trivially tell if x is real or random.
Lemma 13
The following rules are sound when z = x:
For one-way permutations, we also have the following rule:
Notice that the one-wayness of f is not used apparently here. Indeed, the proof of the weakening lemma (see Lemma 2) uses it, and once we apply it, there is only a simple rewriting step left to be able to conclude. . Now using Lemma 1, to be able to conclude to
Intuitively, this comes from the randomness of x and y, which allows us to think it is useless to any adversary trying to compute z. Formally, we show that: 
The Exclusive or Operator
In the following rules, we assume y = z. To understand rule (X1) one should consider y as a key and think about x as the one-time pad encryption of z with the key y. Of course, y has to be random given y and z and not just only y; otherwise, there may exist a some relation between both subterms of x that may allow an adversary to distinguish this latter from a random value. Rules (X2) and (X3) take advantage of the fact that is easy to compute x given y and z.
Lemma 14
The following rule is sound when y ∈ V 1 ∪ V 2 , and y = x:
Moreover, we have the following rules that are sound: 
and since xor is a permutation we can write:
but changing y is useless since 
Concatenation
We have four rules to deal with concatenation command x := y||z. Rule (C1) states that if computing a substring of x out of the elements of V 1 and V 2 is hard, then so is computing x itself. The idea behind (C2) is that y and z being random implies randomness of x, with respect to V 1 and V 2 . Of course, y has to be random given y and z and not just only y; otherwise, there might exist a dependency between both substrings of x that allows an adversary to distinguish this latter from a random value. A similar comment can be made concerning z. Eventually, rules (C3) and (C4) are more than the simple preservation of the properties of a variable t different from x, y, z that the preservation rules would provide. The value of x being easily computable from those of y and z accounts for soundness of these rules. The reader should notice that some rules that hold for Indis can not be generalized to Indis f . It is the case for (P1), (X1), (C2), etc.
Lemma 15
Injective Partially Trapdoor One-way Functions In contrast to the previous section, we do not assume f to be a permutation. On the other hand, we demand a stronger property than one-wayness. Let f : X × Y → Z be a function and let f −1 : Z → X be such that ∀z ∈ dom( f −1 )∃y ∈ Y, z = f ( f −1 (z), y). Here f −1 is a partial function. The function f is said partially one-way, if for any given z = f (x, y), it is computationally impossible to compute a corresponding x. In order to deal with the fact that f is now partially one-way, we add the following rules, where we assume x, y ∈ V ∪ {z} and where we identify f and (x, y) → f (x||y):
(PO1){Indis(νx; V ∪ {x, y}) ∧ Indis(νy; V ∪ {x, y})}z := f (x||y) {Indis f (νz; V ∪ {z})
∧WS(x; V ∪ {z})}
The intuition behind the first part of (PO1) is that f guarantees one-way secrecy of the x-part of x||y. The second part follows the same idea that (P1').
Example 4
We verify Pointcheval's transformer [19] , which can be written shortly as f (r||H(in e ||s))||(in e ||s) ⊕ G(r 
Automation
We can now fully automate our verification procedure of IND-CPA for the encryption schemes. The idea is, for a given program, to compute invariants backwards, starting with the invariant Indis(νout e ; out e , in e , x σ ) at the end of the program.
As several rules can lead to the same postcondition, we in fact compute a set of sufficient conditions at all points of the program: for each set (of postconditions) {φ 1 , . . . , φ n } and each instruction c, we can compute a set of assertions (preconditions) {φ 1 , . . . , φ m } such that, for each i = 1, . . . , n, there exists a subset J ⊆ [1, . . . , m] such that { j∈J φ j }c{φ i } can be derived using the rules given Section 4.3,
The set {φ 1 , . . . , φ m } is computed by applying two steps:
1. First, a set of assertions are computed by matching the command and assertion φ i with postconditions of the Hoare axioms. This allows to compute for each assertion φ i a set of preconditions Pre(φ i ). 2. Next, the consequence rule is applied using Lemma 2, i.e., the assertions in Pre(φ i ) are replaced by stronger assertions, leading to the assertions in {φ 1 , . . . , φ m }.
Since the commands we consider do not include loops, our verification procedure always terminates. However, this verification is potentially exponential in the number of instructions in the encryption command as each postcondition may potentially have several preconditions. This does not seem to be a problem in practice. Indeed, checking Bellare & Rogaway generic construction, for instance, is instantaneous. We implemented that procedure as an Objective Caml program, taking as input a representation of the encryption program.
Conclusion
In this paper we proposed an automatic method to prove IND-CPA security of generic encryption schemes in the random oracle model. Then, IND-CCA can be proved using a general method for proving plaintext awareness as described in [11] . It does not seem difficult to adapt our Hoare logic to allow a security proof in the concrete framework of provable security. Another extension of our Hoare logic could concern OAEP. Here, we need to express that the value of a given variable is indistinguishable from a random value as long as a value r has not been submitted to a hash oracle G. This can be done by extending the predicate Indis(νx; V 1 ; V 2 ). The details are future work.
